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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions
JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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From: 5 October 1950
To : 11 October 1950
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
12 October 1950

No. 10

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no conclusive indications of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. It cannot be determined conclusively whether the Chinese Communists will exercise their substantial capabilities to intervene in Korea, although the deployment of experienced combat troops to Manchuria and reiterated threats of intervention continue to indicate a possibility of such action.
- c. There are clear indications that the North Koreans intend to continue the struggle. It is possible that the U.S.S.R. and Communist China have deferred the establishment of a line of action for North Korea until future developments further clarify the situation.
- d. Successful Viet Minh action against the French has shown the marked increase of Viet Minh effectiveness resulting from Chinese Communist aid and further large-scale Viet Minh attacks may be expected in the near future.
- e. Current Soviet and Satellite military and political activity elsewhere generally do not appear to indicate an imminent diversionary action outside the Far East, nor is there evidence of the general preparatory measures which might be expected to precede an involvement of Soviet forces in the Korean conflict.

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2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA. — See current situation reports. The Chinese Communists have reiterated their implied threats to intervene in Korea but their statements do not provide a clear indication of the nature of the aid which they might extend. The Chinese Communists continue to have the military capability to intervene with experienced combat forces now in Manchuria, but there is no reliable new information on military preparations in the area. The North Koreans have rejected the demand to surrender and clearly intend to continue the struggle north of the 38th parallel.
- b. CHINA. — Reports of the movement of Communist forces inland from the invasion ports on the China coast and unfavorable weather conditions now make it highly probable that the invasion of Formosa has been postponed.
- c. INDO-CHINA. — Viet Minh success in destroying a substantial portion of French forces evacuating Caobang is a serious loss to the French. The marked increase in Viet Minh capabilities and departure from strictly guerrilla tactics indicate a probability of further larger operations, but it cannot be determined whether this is an immediate prelude to a major offensive.
- d. GERMANY. — There is no information to indicate any unexpected development in connection with the East German elections on 15 October, and the East German para-military forces are not apparently preparing to assume immediate operational functions. Some Soviet units are reportedly beginning to return to winter barracks; large scale exercises may be terminating.
- e. SOUTHEAST EUROPE. — There are some indications that Satellite forces have terminated maneuvers and are returning to normal locations. It is possible that the Soviets are preparing for a shift of forces or reorganization of command in Austria, Hungary, and Rumania, but there is no evidence of preparations for immediate operations. Present call-ups may indicate an increase in the size of the Czech Army.

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- f. AUSTRIA. -- Although recent Communist efforts to create major unrest have failed, the Communists retain the capability of seizing power in the Soviet Zone if fully supported by the Soviets.
 - g. GENERAL. -- The previously reported reduction of Soviet shipping in foreign waters does not now appear to be an abnormal security measure, nor is there information on other unusual Soviet precautionary or preparatory measures.
3. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES. -- The Chinese Communists continue to have substantial capabilities for a military intervention in Korea. Current Viet Minh attacks have confirmed the material increase in their capabilities. There was no other apparent significant change during the period.

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REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
11 October 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. Within the past week there has been additional evidence of North Korean intentions to continue the struggle and the Chinese Communists have reiterated their threats of possible intervention in Korea. No new information has been received, however, to clarify Chinese Communist intentions; and it cannot be determined, on the basis of present evidence, whether or not the Chinese Communists will exercise their substantial capabilities to intervene in Korea.

- (1) The North Koreans have rejected the demand to surrender, and their stiffening resistance also indicates that they intend to continue fighting north of the 38th parallel.
- (2) On 11 October the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry issued a statement which declared that Communist China could not "stand idly by" in the face of U.N. advances into North Korea, that this action was a "menace to the security of China," and that the "aggressors must be answerable for their acts in extending the war." This statement, like other previous threats, has provided no clear indication of the nature of the aid which the Chinese Communists may intend to extend to North Korea or whether an overt intervention by Chinese Communist troops is planned.
- (3) There has been no new information with regard to Chinese Communist military activity in Manchuria or on deployments of Chinese Communist Field Forces in the area, and Field Force strength in Manchuria continues to be estimated at 155,000. A possible negative indication of Chinese Communist preparations for immediate hostilities is the fact that a USAF reconnaissance flight on 8 October found the cities of Antung, Port Arthur, Dairen, and cities on the Shantung Peninsula brightly lighted, and no black-out efforts were made.
- (4) In spite of recent reports of continuing airfield construction, there are no reliable indications that the North Korean Air Force has been or will be

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reinforced and no further reports have been received with regard to a concentration of aircraft in the Antung area. Although Chinese Communist air strength is believed to be increasing, there are no indications that it will be committed in the near future, or if committed, the area of employment.

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- (5) Soviet activity in the U.N., though it is becoming less conciliatory, continues to provide no clear indication of Soviet intentions with respect to Korea. The noncommittal tactics of the Soviets suggest the possibility that they have reached no firm decision. It is noteworthy that available information on the Communist Party worldwide line also suggests that the Parties of various countries are uninstructed or at a loss as to how to explain Korean developments.

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c. In Indo-China, the French decision to withdraw the Caobang garrison has apparently offset their gains resulting from the offensive against the Viet Minh in the Thai Nguyen area. According to reports, the withdrawing Caobang garrison of three battalions and a relief column of four battalions driving northward from That Khe have been cut off by the strong Viet Minh forces in the area. It is probable that substantial elements of the French force have been destroyed, which will constitute a serious loss to the French. The action clearly indicates the increased capabilities of the Viet Minh and reflects the extent and effectiveness of Chinese Communist assistance. The Viet Minh attack is a departure from strictly guerrilla warfare tactics which have hitherto been used. Although it is evident that the Viet Minh are now capable of coping with major French forces and that heavier fighting is to be expected, it is too early to determine whether this action is an immediate prelude to a concerted

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Viet Minh effort to drive the French out of Indo-China or presages the adoption of a policy of harassment on a major scale. No new Viet Minh pressure has been reported on the western defense line of border posts around Lackay, but further attacks in this area can be expected at any time. There have been no new indications of Chinese Communist intentions to invade Indo-China with regular forces. Proof of Chinese Communist technical and training assistance to the Viet Minh was established by the capture from Viet Minh forces of Chinese quartermaster accounts and technical training manuals. The effectiveness of Viet Minh antiaircraft fire also reflects increased Chinese logistical support. Reports of undetermined reliability state that two airfields in Kwangsi are now ready for use in aiding the Viet Minh.

d. There is little indication of intensified Communist pressure in other countries of Southeast Asia. In Malaya, British security forces are making slow progress against the Communist insurgents and there is no evidence that any significant degree of outside aid is reaching the insurgents. In Thailand, there is a constant danger of Communist-inspired labor trouble but reports of Chinese Communist plans for such action are not confirmed. Communist-led dissident activity in the Philippines and Burma continues, but there are no indications of major changes in their capabilities, intentions, or methods.

e. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) It cannot be definitely determined whether the Chinese Communists will exercise their substantial capabilities to intervene in Korea, although the deployment of experienced combat troops to Manchuria and reiterated threats of intervention continue to indicate a possibility of such action.
- (2) The North Koreans have shown every indication of continuing the struggle with determination and it is possible that a firm Soviet and Chinese Communist decision as to intervention has been deferred pending future developments, although support of the North Koreans will continue.
- (3) There is a strong likelihood that the invasion of Formosa has been postponed for this year.
- (4) Successful Viet Minh action against the French has at least indicated a marked increase in Viet Minh capabilities, resulting from Chinese Communist assistance, and may be a prelude to other large-scale Viet Minh attacks.

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2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. No information has been reported which would be indicative of further developments in connection with the East German elections of 15 October. Although police patrol of the borders has increased, this is believed to reflect East German concern over the effectiveness of the Western propaganda campaign against the elections. Available information with respect to the East Zone para-military forces provides no indication that these units are about to assume any major operational functions or are preparing for any action immediately following the elections. The present training program of the ground element (Alert Police), which it was previously expected would be terminated by the time of the elections, has been extended to December. Although there are indications of the formation of both a naval and an air arm of the East German forces, these appear definitely to be only a nucleus for further expansion and without significant capabilities at present. [] has reported the formation of an East German air unit at Erfurt which received former German Air Force aircraft in April but, in general, it is believed these units are organized in cadre form for ultimate expansion in the event of an emergency. Also of possible significance is a report that a new canal is to be constructed around Berlin which will bypass the West sectors. Although this canal when completed would be a great help in the blockade of Berlin and may indicate an intent ultimately to reimpose the blockade, it will be some time before it is completed.

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b. It is now believed that the Soviet maneuver program in Germany has progressed somewhat beyond last year's schedule and that larger scale exercises probably did begin about two weeks earlier than last year. Fragmentary reports now indicate that Army exercises (i.e., inter-divisional exercises) possibly were under way in late September and are now probably drawing to a close. It also now appears that some Soviet units have begun to return to winter barracks, although firm evidence of such a general move has not yet been received. A general return of units to their barracks will be a negative indication that combat operations are planned in the near future, particularly if equipment is also returned to maintenance status.

c. In Southeast Europe, similar indications are noted in observations that some units have returned from maneuvers to normal locations. Hungarian Army maneuvers have terminated, and it is reported that some Bulgarian troops are returning to barracks in the Sofia area. There is as yet no confirmation that this trend is general throughout Bulgaria and, as Sofia is quite close to the Yugoslav border, the move to barracks in this area is not necessarily a negative indication of possible Bulgarian operations. There is, however, no information presently available which would point to the probability of fall military operations anywhere in Europe.

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d. Information from Hungary continues to indicate a possibility that the Soviets are planning either the movement of additional troops into Hungary or a possible reorganization of command in this area, but there continues to be no evidence of the arrival of new Soviet units. Previously reported indications of unusual activity have been the apparent shift of two depots or elements thereof from Austria to Hungary, the arrival of small Soviet elements in towns near Budapest, new barracks construction (some of it possibly for Soviet use) and occasional irregular vehicle numbers. If a general reorganization or preparations for the shifting of Soviet forces in Austria, Hungary and Rumania is under way, it is apparently a very gradual process; there has been little apparent haste in these activities and no activity has been reported which would indicate that they are in probable preparation for any imminent operations.

e. In Czechoslovakia, increased road blocks on the German border have been noted, probably as a security measure to restrict border crossers but possibly also as fortifications. There has been evidence for months of intensive security precautions along this border. The callup of the full class of conscripts in Czechoslovakia has begun in possibly somewhat larger numbers than normal. As there is also no information that any men have been released, an increase in the Czech Army may be indicated.

f. After an abortive Communist attempt to create major unrest in Austria, the situation has returned to normal with an apparent considerable loss of Communist and Soviet prestige. Although the incidents have demonstrated the resistance of the Austrians to Communism, the Communist capability to stage a coup in the Soviet Zone of Austria has not diminished and the Austrian police and people would be incapable of preventing such a move if fully backed by the Soviets. The events have indicated, however, that the U.S.S.R. is apparently not yet ready to render such all-out support to the Austrian Communists.

g. The Afghan incursion into Pakistan territory has proved to be no more than another border incident and there is no indication of Soviet or Communist instigation of the incident.

3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. Available information with respect to the recent reduction of the numbers of Soviet vessels in foreign waters does not now indicate any alarming trend and it is believed that shipping outside of Soviet waters will again increase in the near future. No firm conclusion can be drawn as to reasons for the recent reduction.


b. There is no additional information as to the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet IL-12 transports from European runs during good flying weather. The Czech and Polish airlines are still using some IL-12's although the Soviet Aeroflot is not.

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d. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Current information on Soviet and Satellite military and political activity is generally negative with respect to intentions to undertake a diversionary action outside the Far East in the immediate future, although a lack of indications does not preclude such an intention.
- (2) The previously reported indications of possible increased Soviet precautionary measures, particularly with regard to shipping, do not now appear to be an abnormal security measure.
- (3) There is evidence of a continuing long-term program to improve the capabilities of the Satellite armed forces and the military potential of Eastern Europe.


JOHN WEAVERLING
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Chairman, Joint Intelligence
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